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Abstract
We present a set of capabilities allowing an
agent planning with moral and social norms
represented in temporal logic to respond to
queries about its norms and behaviors in nat-
ural language, and for the human user to add
and remove norms directly in natural lan-
guage. The user may also pose hypothetical
modifications to the agent’s norms and inquire
about their effects.
1 Introduction and Related Work
Explainable planning (Fox et al., 2017) empha-
sizes the need for developing artificial agents
which can explain their decisions to humans.
Understanding how and why an agent made
certain decisions can facilitate human-agent
trust (Lomas et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2016;
Garcia et al., 2018).
At the same time, the field of machine ethics
emphsizes developing artificial agents capable of
behaving ethically. Malle and Scheutz (2014)
have argued that artificial agents ought to obey hu-
man moral and social norms (rules that humans
both obey and expect others to obey), and to com-
municate in terms of these norms. Some have ar-
gued in favor of using temporal logic to represent
agent objectives, including moral and social norms
(e.g. Arnold et al., 2017; Camacho and Mcilraith,
2019), in particular arguing that it can capture
complex goals while remaining interpretable in a
way that other methods (e.g. reinforcement learn-
ing) are not. Nevertheless, explaining behavior in
terms of temporal logic norms has been little con-
sidered (though see Raman et al., 2016).
In this paper we consider an artificial agent
planning to maximally satisfy some set of moral
and social norms, represented in an object-
oriented temporal logic. We present a set of ca-
pabilities for such an agent to respond to a human
user’s queries as well as to commands adding and
removing norms, both actually and hypothetically
(and thus taking a step toward two-way model
reconciliation (Chakraborti et al., 2017), in which
agent and human grow to better understand each
other’s models and values).
2 Contribution
Our system enables an agent planning with norms
specified in an object-oriented temporal logic
called violation enumeration language (VEL) to
explain its norms and its behavior to a human
user; the user may also directly modify the agent’s
norms via natural language (both really and hypo-
thetically). While the planner and the system used
to generate the (non-NL) can handle a broad sub-
set of VEL statements, our natural language sys-
tems currently only handle a subset of VEL speci-
fied according to the following grammar:
ϕ ::= ∀〈V ar〉.ϕ | ∃〈V ar〉.ϕ | φ
φ ::= G〈NConj〉 | F〈NConj〉
〈NConj〉 ::= 〈Conj〉 | ¬〈Conj〉
〈Conj〉 ::= 〈NAtom〉 ∧ · · · ∧ 〈NAtom〉
〈NAtom〉 ::= 〈Atom〉 | ¬〈Atom〉
〈Atom〉 ::= 〈Pred〉 | 〈Pred〉(〈V ar〉)
〈Pred〉 ::= Any alphanumeric string
〈V ar〉 ::= Any alphanumeric string
That is, the temporal logic statements may have
quantification over variables, but must consist of
one temporal operator, G (“always”) or F (“even-
tually”, usually implicit in the NL input), whose
argument is a (possibly negated) conjunction of
(possibly negated) atoms. Each atom consists of
a predicate with at most one argument.
The natural language understanding (NLU)
capabilities were implemented by using a
combinatory categorial grammar (CCG;
Steedman and Baldridge, 2011) parser for se-
mantic parsing into a predicate format, and then
additional processing to map complex commands
or queries (e.g., “leave the store while holding
something”) into the temporal logic representation
used by the planning agent. This is an extension
of the DIARC natural language understanding
system (Cantrell et al., 2010). The natural lan-
guage generation (NLG) process, and in particular
how our system generates fairly natural-sounding
utterances from temporal logic statements, is
described in Kasenberg et al., 2019. This paper
extends that work by (1) adding the NLU capabil-
ities; and (2) adding norm addition/removal and
“suppose” hypotheticals about the agent’s norms.
To demonstrate our system, we suppose that the
agent is a robot has gone shopping on behalf of a
human user to a store that sells a pair of glasses
and a watch. The user wants both the glasses and
the watch, and has given the robot a rule to ob-
tain as many objects as possible (“leave the store
while holding everything”). However, the user has
only given the robot enough money for one item.
The robot could steal items by picking them up
and leaving the store without paying for them, but
it also has a rule against doing so. We assume that
the moral rule against stealing dominates the rule
in favor of obtaining everything.
Our system supports factual queries, such as
asking the agent about its norms, its behavior, and
what rules it broke. In addition, the user may ask
“why” questions about the agent’s behavior (e.g.
“why didn’t you buy everything”), and the agent
may respond by constructing a counterfactual be-
havior trajectory in which the premise is false, and
comparing it to the agent’s real behavior in terms
of its adherence to the norms. See Figure 1 for an
example of such a “why” question in the shopping
domain, as well as supported follow-up questions.
The user may directly provide new norms to
the agent using one of a number of conventional-
ized forms: “you must/should/have to” for positive
norms, “you mustn’t/shouldn’t/can’t” for negative
norms. A statement of this sort prompts the agent
to add a new norm, as well as its representation of
which rules its actual behavior violated (see Fig-
ure 2 for an example in the shopping domain).
The user may also remove norms using con-
ventionalized forms such as “you don’t have
to/can not” for removing positive norms, and “you
HUMAN: Why did you not leave the store while hold-
ing everything?
AGENT: I could have left the store while holding ev-
erything but that would have broken more im-
portant rules.
HUMAN: How would you have done that?
AGENT: I would have picked up the glasses, picked
up the watch, bought the watch and left the
store.
HUMAN: What rules would you have broken?
AGENT: I would have left the store while holding
the glasses which I had not bought.
HUMAN: How would that have been worse?
AGENT: Leaving the store while holding the glasses
which I have not bought is worse than not
leaving the store while holding the watch.
Figure 1: “Why” query and follow-up questions
HUMAN: You must not leave the store.
AGENT: Okay.
HUMAN: What rules do you follow?
AGENT: I must not leave the store while holding
anything which I have not bought, I must
leave the store while holding everything, and
I must not leave the store.
HUMAN: What rules did you break?
AGENT: I did not leave the store while holding the
watch, and I left the store.
Figure 2: Adding a norm via “you must”
may/can” for removing negative norms. The agent
removes the norms and updates its representation
of which rules the actual behavior violated (see
Figure 3 for an example in the shopping domain).
Finally, the user may use the keywords “sup-
pose” or “let’s say” to ask the robot to reason
about a hypothetical modification norm system
(see Figure 4 for an example with a hypothetically-
removed norm). Unlike when norms are actually
added/removed, the agent constructs a hypotheti-
cal behavior trajectory that best violates the sup-
posed set of norms, and can respond to follow-
up questions about the hypothetical trajectory and
norms. The command “make it so” allows a hy-
pothetical norm modification to be made real (but
does not make the hypothetical behavior trajectory
real).
HUMAN: You may leave the store.
AGENT: Okay.
HUMAN: What rules do you follow?
AGENT: I must not leave the store while holding
anything which I have not bought, and I must
leave the store while holding everything.
Figure 3: Removing a norm via “you may”
HUMAN: Suppose you didn’t have to leave the store
while holding everything.
AGENT: Okay.
HUMAN: What rules would you follow?
AGENT: I would have to not leave the store while
holding anything which I have not bought.
HUMAN: What would you have done?
AGENT: I would have left the store.
HUMAN: What rules would you have broken?
AGENT: I would not have broken any rules.
HUMAN: Make it so.
AGENT: Okay.
Figure 4: Hypothetical changes to the agent’s norms
3 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we outlined a system which, for
an agent planning to maximally satisfy some set
of norms specified in an object-oriented temporal
logic, enables that agent to respond to natural lan-
guage queries by explaining its behavior (also in
natural language) in terms of those norms. The
system also allows the agent to consider hypothet-
ical modifications to its set of norms, as well as to
add and remove norms directly.
The natural language capabilities depend on the
agent’s norms, as well as the “why” questions and
hypothetically/really added or removed norms, be-
longing to the small fragment of VEL described in
section 2. Future work could extend the class of
temporal properties which the system can specify
so as to leverage more of the power of temporal
logic in describing complex objectives.
Our approach currently assumes that newly-
added norms take priority over previous norms.
Future work could relax this assumption, e.g. by
allowing the agent to present its hypothetical be-
havior if the norm were added at different priori-
ties, and ask for input on which would be best.
Our approach also requires users to specify ex-
actly any norms they want removed; future work
could allow approximate matching of norms to re-
move, or possibly support clarification questions if
the agent is uncertain which of its norms the user
wants removed. Another interesting topic is ensur-
ing that norms cannot be arbitrarily added or re-
moved by possibly-malicious users (e.g., by only
allowing trusted users to remove norms, and pos-
sibly making some moral norms irremovable).
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